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Poverty Data, Measurement and Policy
Special Expanded Edition
In many sub-Saharan Africancountries household surveys are
well designed to measure con-
sumption and poverty as well as
human development outcomes (es-
pecially in education and health)
and access to basic infrastructure.
But detailed information on the
sources of income and the liveli-
hoods of households and individu-
als are still often lacking. This is
problematic because income data
is essential to identify the links
between growth and poverty reduc-
tion, to determine ways to improve
household well-being, and to under-
stand the potential impacts of eco-
nomic shocks and policy reforms.
In a context where countries as
well as international organizations
such as the World Bank are asked
to document the potential poverty
and social impact of the reforms
that they propose (through so-
called Poverty and Social Impact
Analysis), it is important to encour-
age countries to start collecting
data or to improve data collection
on income sources.
To show how simple tabulations
based on income sources data can
inform policy debates, we consider
in this note the case of cotton pro-
ducers. World cotton prices (as
measured by the Cotlook A Index)
have been declining for most of the
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past decade, and farmers in West
and Central Africa especially have
suffered from lower producer prices
paid to them by ginning companies
in recent years. This has led to
heated policy debates and difficult
trade-offs for governments, as their
desire to help producers is con-
strained by the need to avoid large
subsidies that could lead to impor-
tant budget deficits and ultimately
threaten macro-economic stability
and future growth. Using very
simple statistical analysis, this
note shows how the availability of
income data has permitted the es-
timation of measures of poverty
among cotton producers in West
and Central Africa, as well as
simulations of the impact that
changes in producer prices may
have on poverty. A brief discussion
as to why producers continue to
produce cotton despite low prices
paid to them is also provided, to-
gether with some broad level sug-
gestions for policy makers.
Poverty among cotton producers
Income data can first be used to
identify cotton producers in house-
hold surveys (although this could
also be done also with a simple
question in the survey on who is a
producer without the need to col-
lect detailed income data). The
table below provides data for the
“cotton-4” West African countries—
Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, and
Mali. It suggests that cotton produc-
ers are on average more likely to
be poor than the population as a
whole, except in Burkina Faso. The
differences in estimates of the
share of the population in poverty
between cotton producers and the
population as a whole are very large
in Benin, Chad, and especially
Mali.
Data on income sources can also
be used to assess crop production
levels, since when the price paid
to farmers is known, the quantity
produced can be estimated from
earnings data. In turn, data on
quantities produced can be used to
assess who would benefit from
higher producer prices, or who
would be hurt by lower prices The
table above suggests that except for
Burkina Faso, about two-thirds of
cotton production is accounted for
by households in the bottom three
quintiles of the distribution of per
capita consumption. Thus, about
two-thirds of the additional income
(or reduction in income) that would
be generated by higher (lower) cot-
ton producer prices would benefit
(hurt) these households which can
be considered vulnerable because
many among them are poor and
those who are not poor have con-
sumption levels fairly close to the
poverty line. This type of informa-
tion on the benefit incidence of cot-
ton production is useful, because
it can be compared to data on the
benefit incidence of other explicit
or implicit subsidies (or taxes), for
example for various levels of edu-
cation, for health, or for utilities
such as electricity or water.
Impact on poverty of changes in
producer prices
The same data can also be used to
simulate the impact of changes in
producer prices on poverty among
producers and among the popula-
tion as a whole. Consider for ex-
ample the case of Benin in 2003,
the year for which household sur-
vey data are available. In the World
Bank poverty report for Benin, the
extreme poverty line was set in
relative terms at half the mean
yearly consumption per equivalent
adult (124974.5 CFA franc). The
moderate poverty line was set at
166632.7 CFA francs, which corre-
sponds to two thirds of that mean.
This resulted in 39.0 percent of the
population being poor at the na-
tional level, and 21.1 percent be-
ing extremely poor. Using these
poverty lines, the analysis of the
potential impact of different cotton
producer prices on poverty both
among cotton producers and in the
population as a whole can be car-
ried in a very simple way: we
measure the income obtained
from cotton production by
households, assess the differ-
ence in income that would fol-
low from alternative producer
prices, and assume that this
difference in income trans-
lates into an equivalent differ-
ence in the consumption per
equivalent adult of households
used to measure poverty. More so-
phisticated methods could be used
to measure the “general equilib-
rium” effect of a drop in cotton pro-
ducer prices, but such simulations
require a much larger number of
assumptions which are the subject
of debate. The estimations given
here provide “first round” likely
poverty effects from lower producer
prices paid to households due to
the drop in world cotton prices, as-
suming that households can’t com-
pensate their cotton income loss
through other activities, at least
in the short run (work on Burkina
Faso has suggested that the abil-
ity of farmers to compensate for
such losses is indeed limited).
Key results from the simulations
are provided in table 2. The
headcount index of poverty is sim-
ply the share of the population with
a level of consumption per equiva-
lent adult below the moderate pov-
erty line. The poverty gap takes in
addition into account the distance
separating the poor from the pov-
erty line. The squared poverty gap
takes into account the square of
that distance (and thereby the in-
equality among the poor). Similar
definitions apply to the measures
of extreme poverty, which are
based on the extreme poverty line
mentioned above. To interpret the
data in table 2, it is important to
note that in 2003, cotton produc-
Table 1: Poverty among cotton producers and distribution of cotton production by consumption
quintiles for selected West African countries, various years (percent)
 Benin 
(2003) 
Burkina Faso 
(2003) 
Chad 
(2003) 
Mali 
(2006) 
Incidence of poverty     
Whole population 39.0 46.4 55.0 47.4 
Cotton producers 53.3 47.2 72.7 77.8 
Share of cotton production     
Bottom population quintile 22.0 13.1a 24.6 23.2 
Bottom two population quintiles 44.4 32.3a 51.7 48.6 
Bottom three population quintiles 65.9 49.9a 67.3 71.6 
Source: Authors.  Note: a. Data are from the 1997/98 priority survey.
ers were receiving around 180 CFA
franc per kilo according to the sur-
vey. Today, due to the drop in world
cotton prices, producer prices are
lower. If for example, holding pro-
duction levels constants, producers
were to be paid only 130 CFA franc/
kg the headcount index of poverty
at the national level would in-
crease by 1.4 percentage points,
from 39.0 percent to 40.4 percent.
This increase in poverty may be
however underestimated as the
total cotton production in the coun-
try that can be estimated from the
data in the household survey was
slightly below the actual production
in the country in 2003, hence the
survey may have under-repre-
sented producers, or at least the
quantity produced, which would
reduce the simulated impact of the
change in price on poverty.
The headcount index of poverty
among cotton producers would in-
crease much more, from an al-
ready higher base level of 53.3 per-
cent to 61.3 percent. Increases are
also observed for the poverty gap
and the squared poverty gap, and
with these measures of poverty
which take better into account the
impact of price shocks on poorer
producers, the percentage in-
crease in poverty from the initial
level is larger than with the
headcount index. Some observers
might have expected an even
larger impact of changes in pro-
ducer prices on poverty. The main
reason why the impact is not larger
is that cotton producers typically
derive only half their total income
from cotton, and observed income
in the surveys represent about half
of the total consumption of the
households (income is less well
measured than consumption).
Thus, a drop in producer prices of,
say, 30 percent would on average
for a typical farmer lead to a loss
in consumption of only 7.5 percent.
Of course, for some farmers, the
loss will be much higher. Another
important point to be mentioned is
the fact that the losses could be
larger, for example if there were
negative spillover effects to the rest
of the economy from the lower
prices paid to producers. On the
other hand, cotton producers might
also be able to diversify into other,
more profitable crops, which would
then reduce the negative impact
of the drop in producer prices on
poverty among them.
Broader issues
As mentioned in the introduction,
given the above, governments are
faced with a difficult dilemma. On
the one hand, there is a desire on
the part of governments to protect
cotton producers from the down-
turn in prices, typically by allow-
ing the parastatal companies con-
trolling the cotton sector in their
country to continue to pay rela-
tively high prices to producers. Be-
cause governments are the main
shareholder in these parastatal,
and must ultimately absorb any
loss that the firms incur, main-
taining high producer prices is es-
sentially equivalent to providing a
direct subsidy to cotton producers.
Unfortunately, when national pro-
duction of cotton is high, the cost
of such subsidies is also high and
Source: Authors using Benin CWIQ 2003 household survey data.
  180  
CFAF/Kg 
170  
CFAF/Kg 
160  
CFAF/Kg 
150  
CFAF/Kg 
140  
CFAF/Kg 
130  
CFAF/Kg 
120  
CFAF/Kg 
110  
CFAF/Kg 
Extreme poverty, population as a whole         
Headcount index of poverty 21.1 21.4 21.6 21.8 22.1 22.3 22.5 22.8 
Poverty gap 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.8 5.9 6.1 
Squared poverty gap 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 
Extreme poverty, cotton producers         
Headcount index of poverty 29.6 31.9 33.0 34.2 35.6 36.9 38.1 40.0 
Poverty gap 7.2 7.8 8.5 9.2 10.0 10.8 11.7 12.6 
Squared poverty gap 2.6 2.9 3.2 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.1 5.8 
Poverty, population as a whole         
Headcount index of poverty 39.0 39.1 39.2 39.3 39.7 40.0 40.2 40.4 
Poverty gap 11.3 11.5 11.6 11.8 11.9 12.1 12.3 12.5 
Squared poverty gap 4.7 4.7 4.8 4.9 5.0 5.2 5.3 5.4 
Poverty, cotton producers         
Headcount index of poverty 53.3 53.9 54.7 55.3 57.5 59.2 60.7 61.3 
Poverty gap 15.8 16.7 17.5 18.4 19.4 20.4 21.4 22.5 
Squared poverty gap 6.5 7.0 7.5 8.1 8.7 9.4 10.2 11.0 
Table 2: Impact of alternative cotton producer prices on poverty in Benin (2003 data)
may lead to public deficits that
threaten to affect the macroeco-
nomic stability of the countries, as
well as their ability to respond to
other needs of the population, for
example in the social sectors.
There is no easy solution to the
problem, but again, data on income
sources from nationally represen-
tative surveys can at least help to
clarify the trade-offs involved in
various policy choices and simu-
late the potential impacts of these
choices.
When deciding on a policy course,
it is also important to keep in mind
the short term as well as the long
term effects of the decisions made.
Even if it may make sense to keep
producer prices higher than what
the world market permits, and
thereby to incur a loss for one year
or two, this cannot be repeated
from year to year to avoid provid-
ing wrong incentives to both gin-
ners and cotton producers at high
budgetary costs for the country. If
world cotton prices remain de-
pressed, as seems likely in the
foreseeable future, incentives
need to be given to producers to pro-
gressively shift to other crops or
activities. At the same time, even
if the base price is low, but still
fluctuating, efforts should go to-
ward designing appropriate miti-
gating and coping strategies for
dealing with price shocks. To this
end, governments and private
stakeholders should work toward
designing sector-based pricing
mechanisms that help in reducing
the magnitude of price shocks.
When prices are higher, these
mechanisms entail sacrifices in
the short run (as producers and
ginners set aside resources to pro-
vide funding for the mechanism for
later downturns).
In Mali for example, steps were
taken toward such a mechanism
between the Government, produc-
ers, and CMDT in January 2005.
First, the baseline price level for
the campaigns 2005-06 up to 2007-
08 was set at CFAF 160/kg to
FACFA 175/kg, which was more in
line with expected future prices
than the level of 210 CFAF/kg that
prevailed at the time. Second, a
formula was adopted to define the
producer price as a share of the
world benchmark price, after tak-
ing into account a number of cost
and efficiency variables related to
the processing and commercializa-
tion of cotton. A key objective was
to ensure that producers receive
about 60 percent of the income
generated by the sector, the other
40 percent going to the national
parastatal. Third, the pricing
mechanism agreed upon by the
parties included a measure de-
signed to fund a stabilization fund.
Beyond measures designed to
deal with producer prices, the high
level of poverty observed among
producers begs the question as to
why farmers continue to produce
cotton in West and Central Africa
despite low producer prices and the
fact that they remain rather poor?
This is a complex issue, but at
least five main reasons may ex-
plain this apparent paradox. First,
to produce cotton gives producers
the certitude they will get a mon-
etary income at a predetermined
moment. This income helps pro-
ducers to face current and unex-
pected expenses (for example for
health or education). Cotton pro-
duction offers a certain security
despite low prices, with the guar-
antee that parastatal companies
will buy the whole production and
that they will be paid relatively
quickly. Second, to produce cotton
gives access to credit. And produc-
ers need this credit not only to get
access to inputs but also to improve
their productive material or for con-
sumption purpose. In most coun-
tries, the banking system and the
micro-finance institutions do not
deliver credits to farmers who do
not produce cotton. Access to credit
in rural areas usually goes
through guarantees linked to the
production of cotton. Third, to pro-
duce cotton gives farmers access
to inputs, again through the
parastatals. Farmers need those
inputs for cotton production but
they also use parts of the inputs
for cereals production which mat-
ters for food self-sufficiency. Fourth,
to produce cotton gives farmers
access to some training and edu-
cation concerning new varieties,
technical improvements, etc. Fi-
nally, cotton production in any
given year has positive “afterwards
effects” on cereals yields in the
next year as the use of chemical
and/or natural inputs needed for
cotton improve ground fertility at
crop rotation time. In other words,
to pertain to “the cotton club” brings
many advantages to peasants,
which may explain why most of
them continue to produce cotton,
at least for some time, despite the
fact that producer prices are going
down.
Is cotton production going to be
profitable at the lower prices that
are now paid to farmers across
West and Central Africa? Limited
data are available to assess how
profitable cotton production is to
farmers. The analysis of a survey
of cotton producers implemented in
Mali in the summer of 2004 sug-
gests however that only those pro-
ducers who are better equipped
make a substantial gain on their
production. More precisely, while
in the 2003-2004 campaign, the
nominal price paid to producers
was 190 CFA franc/kg, the net
price received was of the order of
100 CFA franc/kg. The main costs
that explain the difference be-
tween the nominal and net prices
are the costs of inputs provided by
the parastatal company (estimated
at about 70 CFA franc/kg in the
survey, but other data suggest that
this cost may in some cases reach
90 CFA franc/kg, which is high),
and the reimbursement of loans to
the parastatal (in most cases) at
about 15 CFA franc/kg. Other costs
not related to the services provided
by the parastatal include cotton
land maintenance costs, cotton
harvest costs, and cotton transpor-
tation costs, as well as broader in-
vestment costs, production costs,
and taxes and fees. Overall, these
costs vary from 43 CFA franc/kg to
131 CFA franc/kg depending on the
method used for allocating part of
these costs to the production of cot-
ton as opposed to other crops, and
depending on the type of producer
considered. A key finding was that
producers belonging to the better
equipped groups were the most
profitable. For poorer households
who do not have good equipment,
cotton production is less advanta-
geous. This means that poorer
households could very well be those
who will stop production if prices
remain low for long periods of time,
but at the same time these produc-
ers also need probably the most the
cash income that is provided to
them by the cultivation of cotton.
Conclusion
The objective of this note, which
was prepared as a background
piece for a publication on data and
development indicators in Africa,
was to show that income data from
nationally representative house-
hold surveys can be very useful in
order to inform policy. Without in-
come data, it is very difficult to
identify the links between growth
and poverty reduction, to deter-
mine ways to improve household
well-being, and to understand the
potential impacts of economic
shocks and/or policy reforms. In
order to demonstrate how simple
tabulations based on income data
can inform policy, a case study on
cotton producers in West and Cen-
tral Africa was presented. The data
suggest that cotton producers tend
to be much poorer than the popu-
lation as a whole, and that about
two thirds of the production of cot-
ton in Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad
and Mali is accounted for by pro-
ducers who are poor or near-poor.
This means that about two thirds
of the subsidies given to producers
(or taxes levied on them) would ben-
efit (or hurt) vulnerable house-
holds. We have also shown that
while changes in producer prices
may not have a very large impact
on national poverty measures,
they do affect cotton producers in
a significant way, even though on
average these producers tend to
have only half their total income
generated by cotton (and observed
income in the surveys represent
half of the total consumption of the
households).
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